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TOWARD A WORLD ORDER RESPECTFUL OF THE 
GLOBAL ECOSYSTEM 
Richard A. Falk* 
THE NEED FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER 
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 brought an end to the Thirty 
Years' War and marked the beginning of the modern system of world 
order which accepts, as its basis, the autonomy of sovereign states. 
To this day, the quality of world order reflects the interactions 
between national governments. Threats and warfare have been the 
most salient of these interactions, constituting both the principal 
energy of change and the main instrument of order in world affairs. 
World Wars I and II brought about a determined effort to mitigate 
the effects of global politics based on war by building up central 
international institutions of peace and security. The League of Na-
tions and the United Nations were the main products of these efforts, 
but these organizations have acted primarily as instruments of sov-
ereign cooperation rather than as substitutes for the dominance of 
sovereign states. The military power of states continues to reside at 
national levels, and the driving forces in world affairs continue to be 
associated with intense competition for disputed territory, economic 
control and political influence. From 1914 to 1970 is not a long period 
of time in which to transform governing structures, public attitudes, 
and the political consciousness of elite groups. The great historical 
question, accentuated by the persisting danger of large-scale nuclear 
war, is whether the political life of mankind can be reorganized 
before rather than after some kind of catastrophic breakdown. 
National governments are no longer able to solve the most serious 
problems facing the welfare and security of their own popUlations. 
• Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Center of International 
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We have grown accustomed to this basic reality in relation to nuclear 
weaponry. We now know that immense budgetary expenditures on 
military hardware by the United States have led, not to greater 
security, but to offsetting measures by principal adversary govern-
ments,and that the two strongest states in the world would be likely 
to lose at least 100 million people as well as their major cities in the 
first 24 hours of an all-out attack by either side. There is no defense 
system that either of these states can now construct that is likely to 
work if the other state makes an all-out effort to penetrate it. There-
fore, peace and security depend on the will and wisdom of the elite 
of a foreign government, and not upon the military prowess and 
preparedness of a defensive state. Such a reality makes us aware of 
the thin line, precariously maintained by fallible human beings and 
complex electronic equipment, which separates security from catas-
trophe in our world. 
In the last few years this fundamental international condition has 
been further complicated by a new set of dangers associated with 
mounting pressures on the global environment. These pressures 
stem from the cumulative interplay of population growth and tech-
nological development. At this state we do not yet have the facts 
and figures to enable a full appreciation of the scale of danger, nor 
do we know enough about the tolerance limits of oceans, river sys-
tems, and the atmosphere to identify with any precision the danger 
. points and, especially, to specify thresholds of irreversibility. As 
ecologists have started to warn us, many environmental systems do 
not deteriorate gradually but, rather, are able to maintain the basic 
integrity of their character virtually until the point of collapse. It is 
this deception of man by nature that has contributed, for instance, 
to the ecological collapse of large inland water systems such as Lake 
Erie; warnings about deterioration were discounted for years be-
cause of fairly favorable quality reports until the time of abrupt 
collapse, at which point the processes of decay could no longer be 
feasibly arrested. The point is that we do not know the extent to 
which the increased pollution of the oceans and atmosphere is gen-
erating a process of decay that will soon cross thresholds of irrever-
sibility, nor do we even have effective means at present to collect 
such information. We do know that there has been an immense 
buildup of harmful pollutants in the oceans, most especially of oil, 
lead, mercury, and DDT, and that major disruptive impacts on ma-
rine ecosystems are likely to occur at some point in the future. 
Similarly, we know that these pressures are likely to continue and 
to grow worse as more and more people organize to live at higher 
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standards of living, and as industrial societies develop more and 
more sophisticated technologies to facilitate their further mastery 
over nature. 
The frequency and the severity of environmental crises having 
international implications is clearly increasing. The Torrey Canyon 
breakup is an example of the inevitable outcome of a rapidly ex-
panding volume of oceanic transport of oil by tankers. The record 
shows that the increasing number of tanker accidents each year 
corresponds roughly to the increasing volume of activity. The in-
creasing rate at which man exploits the planet is leading to other 
problems and challenges which may be less specific but are poten-
tially even more disastrous. The possibility that radioactive and 
other highly toxic wastes may have serious impact on life in the 
oceans, the fear of global weather modification arising inadvertently 
from the buildup of C02 and particulate matter in the atmosphere, 
and the chances of earthquakes resulting from underground nuclear 
explosions are but a few examples. At this stage we have not yet 
even drawn up a complete or accurate agenda of issues, but it is 
evident that the political fragmentation of mankind into separately 
administered states handicaps the efforts to solve any of them. The 
basic ecological premise posits the wholeness and interconnectedness 
of things. 1 It already seems clear that the basis of life on earth is 
imperiled by the absence of any central mechanisms of effective 
guidance and control on an international level. 
THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF SOVEREIGN STATES: PERMISSIVE 
EXPLOITATION 
Unlike domestic society, the activities of men and nations in the 
international realm are virtually free from consistent patterns of 
regulation. In the present system, land on the continents and the 
airspace above it are viewed as the private property of individuals 
or nations, while the oceans and the airspace over oceans are viewed 
as belonging to everyone, to be shared and used for mutual benefit. 
People are not revising their attitudes toward property, in spite of 
developments in modern technology which render obsolete the prem-
ises underlying the present system. It is helpful to isolate three basic 
premises to which these remarks apply. 
1 On ecological perspectives see DAVID w. EHRENFELD, BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 
(1970); EUGENE ODUM, EcoLOGY (1969); PAUL SHEPARD AND DAVID McKINLEY, THE SUB-
VERSIVE SCIENCE: ESSAYS TOWARD AN EcoLOGY OF MAN (Paul Shepard & David McKinley, 
eds., 1969). 
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1. The Premise of Excess Capacity. In earlier decades, the volume 
of human demands being made on the environment was small in 
relation to the capacity of the environment to sustain life. Although 
local shortages of food, water, and land have long existed, and ri-
valries among social groups have generated wars, the dynamics of 
conflict have seemed to be fully consistent with the indefinite contin-
uation of life on earth. Even the forecasts about the end of the world 
which are found in several major religious traditions do not reveal 
any awareness of the finiteness of the earth as an island in space 
sustaining a limited quantity of life and vulnerable to ecological 
disaster. 
The situation today has been greatly moderated by the develop-
ment of modern public health and by dramatic advances in agricul-
ture. As a result, the world can accommodate a far larger number 
of people in the sense of keeping them alive, but in the course of so 
doing, especially in industrialized societies, great pressures on the 
environment have built up. The limited capacity of our air and water 
to disperse our wastes, the limited yields of minerals which can be 
extracted from rocks close to the surface of the earth, and the 
vanishing of species are among the factors which have recently made 
us aware of global scarcity and have undermined our earlier confi-
dence in global abundance. International society, however, continues 
to be almost completely unregulated, in spite of the fact that a 
laissez-faire system of organization is only effective in the absence 
of scarcity. 
Regulation is currently limited to special situations where overuse 
creates "conservation" issues, as with whale hunting. The experience 
with whale hunting is a dismal one, but is worth recounting because 
it illustrates the limited prospects for effective enforcement when 
sovereign states are not held accountable for failure to comply. 
In 1946 those nations involved in whaling negotiated and signed a 
convention which established the principle of quotas for annual whale 
catches. Whale catches were to be limited in such a way that whaling 
interests could sustain profitable yields over long periods of time, a 
typical management goal whenever a renewable resource (timber is 
another example) is involved. However, the International Whaling 
Commission, which was to administer the convention, possessed 
neither the power nor the independence from the national whaling 
industries that was necessary to carry out the conservation program. 
At first, the quotas were set at levels beyond what could be caught, 
and hence were meaningless. Then, when in spite of reduced catches 
whaling companies still said that there was no scientific evidence 
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that whales were endangered, the International Whaling Commis-
sion asked authorities in population dynamics to study the problem 
in detail. In 1963 they filed a report to the International Whaling 
Commission substantiating the dangers, but the Commission refused 
to act on it. A report filed in 1964 with additional information met a 
similar fate. At this point the International Whaling Commission 
almost broke up, since by the convention it was obliged to act in 
accordance with any scientific evidence presented to it. Finally, in 
1965 a special meeting was called, and quotas which began to take 
account of the scientific recommendations were agreed upon. Since 
then, the quotas have slowly come more into line with the recom-
mendations, although with no enforcement machinery and no inter-
national observers it is difficult to judge to what extent even these 
limits have been heeded. Meanwhile, the blue whale, the largest 
animal that has ever lived on earth, is headed for extinction. Prob-
ably fewer than 300 blue whales remain at this time. 
At present Russia and Japan, the only major whaling nations, are 
responsible for about 85 percent of the activity. The United States 
annually has bought about 20 percent of all whale products, mostly 
from Japan. Recently the United States decided to act unilaterally. 
On December 5, 1969, President Nixon signed into law the Endan-
gered Species Act; on June 2, 1970 the Department of the Interior 
published a list of the species which were to be protected; all species 
of giant whales were included. Because of this new law, no whale or 
whale products in any form can be brought into the United States. 
But enlightened though belated actions by single governments can-
not disguise the fact that this experiment in international cooperation 
has so far been a failure. 
2. The Premise of Local Impact. A system of sovereign and in-
dependent states is appropriate only for an era when the conse-
quences of a nation's actions are confined within its own territories. 
Even today most events continue to be of local significance in this 
sense, and can be regulated by local governing bodies. Special situ-
ations sometimes arise, as when state A allows its industrial corpo-
rations to dispose of raw wastes upstream and the downstream users 
in state B become victims of pollution; if causation is clear, the states 
generally deal with one another directly. Measures to curb water 
pollution and to provide for navigation on the Danube and Rhine 
rivers illustrate the capacity of the present system to evolve gen-
erally satisfactory cooperative procedures. The treaty method has 
acted as a flexible instrument of adjustment where the actions in 
one state have been causing damage to another. 
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But when the effects are more diffuse and represent the cumula-
tive outcome of numerous, separate, small instances, each of which 
may seem trivial, even benign, as with industrial processes under-
lying ocean and air pollution, then the present system shows almost 
no capacity for successful response. Nuclear testing in the atmo-
sphere is a spectacular example of the widening scope and length-
ening duration of events located specifically in space and time (that 
is, at the test site at the time of the test). Similarly, the balance of 
gases in the global atmosphere can be altered, with implications for 
the global climate, by the combustion of fossil fuels in a single 
country, or even, perhaps, by the operation of a single nation's fleet 
of supersonic aircraft. 
3. The Premise of Compatible Use. In the past, when resources 
were plentiful and actions were localized, the use of one geographical 
arena rarely restricted the use of any other, nor did different uses 
of the same area often overlap in dangerous ways. Exploitation of 
the land and the rivers did not have serious repercussions upon the 
use of the oceans, and vice versa. In addition, the principal uses of 
the oceans for navigation, fishing, and naval operations were gen-
erally mutually compatible. Certain specific conflicts might occur-
for instance, by overfishing in a particular area-but these could 
usually be either resolved by specific agreement or allowed to result 
in the temporary deterioration of a particular resource. The inter-
national law of the oceans accommodated basic needs by finding 
compromises between national sovereignty and community control. 
Coastal nations, for example, were granted a belt of special authority 
over offshore waters in recognition of special security, economic, and 
health interests-a procedure that worked well so long as the ter-
ritorial needs of these nations were limited to within a few miles of 
the shore. On the "high seas" nations have agreed not to interfere 
with each other's activities, and these agreements have worked 
largely because the separate activities were mutually compatible. 
In recent years, however, these arrangements have come under 
increasing pressure, and territorial sovereignty has been expanded 
at the expense of the areas to which a community concept once 
applied. This has happened for several reasons. First, the technology 
of war has increased the distance from the shore at which a country 
can be threatened militarily. Second, the technology of fishing and 
mining has made it possible for the most advanced countries to 
operate at great distances from their homeland and more successfully 
than coastal states relying on more primitive techniques. As a result 
poorer states have claimed protective custody over vast stretches of 
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ocean water; Chile, Ecuador and Peru, for instance, have claimed 
exclusive sovereign control over waters 200 miles from their shores. 
Third, the value of mineral resources on the continental shelf has 
led states to claim this wealth for their own nationals. 
Beyond this, evidence is emerging that there are incompatibilities 
of use even in the areas of the ocean not claimed by any state. 
Reliance on persistent pesticides for agricultural development on 
land causes damage to marine ecology in the middle of the ocean in 
a variety of ways, still not fully understood. Similarly, attempts to 
mine the oceans' mineral resources may endanger fishing industries. 
And finally the use of the ocean for the disposal of lethal nerve gas 
may cause harm to the entire community of ocean users and to the 
ocean itself. 
In summary, current methods of regulating activity on land and 
in the oceans are geared to lower levels of demand for goods and to 
less sophisticated technologies of exploitation than now exist. The 
existing system of competition among sovereign states is not only 
obsolete, however; it is also counterproductive. 
The logic of competition induces maximum self-assertion, contrary 
to the collective good. 2 Countries agree to cooperate today only when 
the issue is trivial or merely facilitative (for example, fixing the 
conditions of international postal service or governing the exchange 
of diplomats). But countries cannot be compelled to cooperate, and 
the objective of a majority of the nations of the world is often 
thwarted when cooperation is not universal. Thus China and France 
can continue to contaminate the globe with radioactive fallout, in 
disregard of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and Japanese whalers can 
ignore the international regime set up to assure whale conservation. 
South Africa can continue with racial oppression, Brazil can encour-
age population growth, and the United States can dump as much 
nerve gas into the ocean as it wishes. 
The sale of arms provides a good example of how competition 
between nations impedes the development of international controls. 
Most national governments are eager to build up a favorable balance 
of trade and regard it as highly desirable to earn large quantities of 
foreign exchange. Arms sales to foreign countries are very tempting, 
especially when the decision to forego the sale is likely merely to 
shift the transaction to another less scrupulous country, with the 
2 This phenomeon has been called "The Tragedy of the Commons." For an analysis of this 
issue see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243-48 (1968); cf. 
Beryl Crowe, The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, 166 ScIENCE 1103-07 (1969). 
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result that the earnings and, quite possibly, political leverage are 
lost. Sales can be restricted only if all principal suppliers curb their 
activities effectively and simultaneously. Given the degree of divi-
siveness in international society, it should not be surprising that it 
is difficult to make such a cooperative system work reliably. In fact, 
the realization of difficulty induces a sense of futility. Why try if 
trying is likely to penalize the more civic-minded national govern-
ments? The experience with international sanctions also illustrates 
the limits of cooperation in much the same way. The high degree of 
verbal consensus in support of economic sanctions against the Smith 
regime in Rhodesia has not achieved its goals, principally because 
South Africa and a few other countries do not want these sanctions 
to work. 
The competition between nations which is partially responsible for 
the environmental crisis is also responsible for distracting attention 
from it. Can one imagine a discussion of environmental quality be-
tween an Arab and an Israeli leader? These and other nations are 
preoccupied by international rivalries, and devote their resources 
and energies mainly to promoting national security. 
Habits of competition also impel the poor nations to pursue what 
the rich nations possess. Rich and poor alike specify self-interest in 
terms of more wealth, more power, more growth, and sometimes 
even more people. The possibility of a global environmental crisis is 
on the verge of providing the rich nations with new excuses to 
neglect the demands of the poor nations, however. There is serious 
reason to question whether the globe could remain habitable if the 
entire world popUlation were to live the way Americans live at the 
present time, with all the inefficiency and waste now present in 
American society. The rich nations may perceive this as a valid 
reason for trying to persuade the poor nations to modify their plans 
for industrialization. But the poor nations are likely to repudiate this 
advice and urge the rich nations to control their consumption. More-
over, the poor countries are sure to point out that the gap between 
the standards of living in the rich and poor countries is still widening. 
The present inequalities and rivalries among nations thus compli-
cate any attempt to replace competitive patterns of behavior by 
cooperative ones. The current negotiations over the terms of inter-
national inspection of nuclear power installations in countries not 
possessing nuclear weapons is a case in point. In accordance with 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, national nuclear programs are 
to be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
after a state voluntarily offers to have its program subject to exter-
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nal control. When IAEA inspection finally begins in 1972, inspectors 
are likely to find their role limited to that of auditors. Italy, Japan, 
and West Germany want inspection confined to the input and output 
of the nuclear plants, for fear that inspectors who obtained knowl-
edge of techniques used inside the plants might give useful infor-
mation to competitors. 3 
About the only way in which present inequalities could have ben-
eficial implications for the global environment is by opening up op-
portunities for ecological trade-offs. For example, industrial coun-
tries might establish preferential trade relations with those poorer 
countries that agree to use safe substitutes for DDT. In the great 
majority of instances, however, the habits of competition among 
nations will retard the search for methods of global environmental 
control. 
There are some significant exceptions to this bleak picture that 
illustrate the potentiality for international cooperation within the 
present system of sovereign states. A treaty signed on December 1, 
1959, has so far effectively ruled out a competitive struggle for 
sovereign control over the Antarctic and has allowed the 12 inter-
ested nations to pursue their separate courses of scientific investi-
gation and discovery in a spirit of harmony and cooperation. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) works on problems common to 
all countries, including control and eradication of diseases, and the 
protection of health through public health services. Its concern with 
environmental health problems, research, and education is the con-
cern of countries, and thus WHO can work harmoniously, effectively, 
and without fanfare. On a binational level, joint commissions that 
have been in existence for a long time are suddenly being reinvigo-
rated in response to the recent upsurge of interest in environmental 
regulation. For instance, representatives of the governments of the 
United States and Canada held a meeting in June 1970 to discuss 
common problems of pollution and eutrophication in the Great Lakes. 
They agreed to adopt and enforce certain common measures, includ-
ing regulations requiring removal of at least 80 percent, of phos-
phates from sewage and industrial waste disposal. Also, the Soviet 
Union and the United States have had some success in reaching 
agreements that prevent the arms race from being fully carried over 
to outer space or the ocean floor and have stimulated wider agree-
3 See the N. Y. TIMES, July 27, 1970, at 5. For a detailed analysis of the IAEA's functions 
and problems, see Lawrence Scheinman, Nuclear Safeguards, the Peaceful Atom, and the 
lAEA, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 5-64 (No. 572, Mar. 1969). 
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ments to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons, such as the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 
current proposals before the United Nations which would prohibit 
weapons from being stationed on the ocean floor are further encour-
aging signs. 
PROSPECTS FOR AN ADEQUATE WORLD ORDER SYSTEM 
At the present stage of international development, there is no 
general or common appreciation of the threats of the environment 
or what to do about them. The United Nations is scheduling an initial 
world conference in 1972, but it is unlikely to provide more than an 
exchange of views and suspicions, and possibility the formulation of 
highly abstract declaratory standards. There is not as yet any ap-
propriate sense of the magnitude of the task and of its urgency, and 
there is no understanding of the extent to which the protection of 
the environment will require an organizational and attitudinal rev-
olution on a global level. Such a lack of awareness persists in gov-
ernment circles, even in a country such as the United States which 
has grown alarmed about environmental issues in recent years. 
Yet, eventually, change must come. Separate, unequal, competing 
sovereign states will have to be replaced as prime centers of inter-
national decisionmaking in the environmental field, and world polit-
ical institutions to which responsibility will pass must be given the 
authority to monitor the environmental condition of the planet, to 
react quickly to disasters, to ration scarce resources, to zone inter-
national waters according to permissible uses, to set pollution stan-
dards, and to enforce its rules and regulations. It is likely that global 
institutions will be expected to resolve conflicts, apportion resources, 
and secure human justice in a wider range of situations than would 
be suggested by a narrow interpretation of conservation and envi-
ronmental management. 
Suppose a limited form of world government were to come into 
existence, with power to regulate all uses of the ocean. How should 
it use this power? It certainly would change the present system of 
registering ships, whereby a small country like Liberia can establish 
exceptionally permissive licensing procedures because it is more 
concerned with revenues from tanker registries than with the pro-
tection of the oceans against unseaworthy vessels. The Torrey Can-
yon, a substandard oil tanker registered in Liberia, might not have 
been permitted to operate in a more ecologically conscious world. 
But what about the extraction of natural resources from the ocean? 
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Should our hypothetical world organization forbid all mining by the 
enterprises of individual nations and do the mining itself? Should it 
instead issue licenses? Should it collect royalties or taxes, and if so, 
how should the revenues be used? Most important, should it regulate 
the distribution of the minerals extracted from the oceans, and if 
so, according to what principle? There are a host of alternative 
economic and political models of operation that could be incorporated 
into such a world organization. 
The distinct ecological consequences of various modes of operation 
may be difficult to discern. For example, an ocean resource policy 
that puts a heavy penalty on ocean extraction may drive individual 
nations to exploit their domestic reserves beyond wise limits. A 
country might decide not to extract oil from shale by underground 
nuclear explosions if deep ocean oil were readily available. It might 
decide to station fewer power plants on its rivers and lakes if deep 
ocean sites were permitted. Should a world organization encourage 
or discourage exploitation of the ocean resources? If it discourages 
their exploitation, is there any way in which it can simultaneously 
affect resource use within the territorial limits of the sovereign 
states? 
The last question suggests that we reexamine our hypothetical 
world organization. Does it make sense to separate the problem of 
ocean management from land management? Politically, this separa-
tion could be a practical way to gain experience with the kinds of 
jurisdictional problems that arise from the interplay of modern tech-
nology and ecology. A more extensive form of world order could 
emerge from success in undertaking such a modest first step. Eco-
logical realities, however, could make such a scheme unworkable. 
Improper land use practices can lead to the deterioration of coastal 
estuaries, which in turn can disrupt the life cycles of much ocean 
life. Thus it may make better ecological sense for a world organiza-
tion to acquire authority over land use and ocean use in a coordinated 
fashion. To maintain political eqUilibrium during the coming period 
of transition will tax the skills of the world's diplomats and inter-
national lawyers to an unprecedented degree. 
It is clear that the establishment of a world government in and of 
itself does not guarantee a saner approach to the environment than 
what we now have. Indeed, we can speculate that if we had had an 
obtuse world government for the last few decades, things could be 
a lot worse. Suppose that twenty years ago, before the environmen-
tal crisis was widely recognized, world-wide pressures to remove 
the threat of nuclear war had brought about the replacement of the 
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present political system with a world government. That government 
would probably have sought to overcome some of the inequalities 
among nations by stimulating capital transfers and by building huge 
power and agroindustrial projects to take advantage of the aggregate 
capacities of river basin systems and other large natural networks. 
Several projects of this kind have been retarded, thus far, by national 
boundaries and sovereign competition (even among friendly neigh-
bors such as the United States and Canada or Mexico). Such political 
obstacles to man's intrusion upon nature would almost certainly have 
been cast aside, if world government had been instituted in a period 
prior to the emergency of some sensitivity about environmental 
quality. 
Even the present period may be too soon from this point of view, 
for every potent world ideology today continues to maintain a strong 
commitment to achieving a maximum economic growth through the 
rapid expansion of the industrial sector and this commitment accel-
erates environmental decay. However the decay, in turn, is produc-
ing a shock of recognition in the richest and most industrialized 
countries; a greater awareness of the tolerances of the planet is 
beginning to emerge. Therefore it is fortuitous that environmental 
awareness, which strengthens the antiwar pressures for a more 
cooperatively conceived organization of life on earth, may at the 
same time reduce some of the hazards of concentration of authority. 
The sequence of pressures may lead to a more rational eventual 
solution. Yet it remains questionable whether there is enough time 
available to make adjustments in the world-order system. These 
adjustments can not take place until after significant movements for 
world-order reform emerge in the main cultural, ethical, political, 
and economic centers of world activity. 
The future of human society depends on making the case persua-
sive that the present pattern of relations governing man-in-society 
and man in nature endangers the whole species and the entire planet, 
and that positive alternatives exist and can be brought into being. 
The mere depiction of a disaster is likely to discourage action unless 
it is coupled with a program for positive action. Fear in isolation 
induces immobility, not conversion and passionate action. We need 
to develop plausible alternatives to global disaster, and to establish 
a humane set of substitutes for the automatic checks of war, disease, 
and famine-which never were compatible with the dignity of man 
and society. The need is for new visions of world order based on the 
conditions of dynamic eqUilibrium between man and nature. 
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In the meantime stopgap measures and educational activities are 
useful kinds of initiatives. It will be desirable to take action to avoid 
specific disasters, for instance, radioactive leakage from nuclear 
power plants or the further pollution of international rivers and 
lakes. It may also be possible to engage in joint ventures to ensure 
that only beneficial appropriation of minerals from the oceans takes 
place. Institutions through which nations cooperate are rapidly ex-
panding in number, variety, and role to meet the needs of an increas-
ingly interdependent world, and they should provide considerable 
experience and a cadre of experts with careers and values built 
around a more cooperative approach to international relations. Only 
a shared sense of the problems facing mankind will make it possible 
to work toward a shared solution. We possess the technology of 
communication, information-dispersal, and transportation that will 
facilitate centralized management. Indeed the efficiency of these new 
technologies poses a new set of threats to human welfare that will 
need to be taken into account. 
Minor adjustments within the existing international order can do 
no more than gain time for the initiation of drastic changes in the 
world-order system. The need for drastic change suggests the like-
lihood of struggle between those who operate and benefit from the 
present political system and those who support the creation of an 
increasingly powerful world government. Good education, as always, 
should pursue a strategy of subversion, weakening confidence in 
existing arrangements, and even converting the old elite to the new 
vision; but it seems likely that the defenders of the status quo will 
condemn and suppress those who work visibly and effectively toward 
a new world system based on an ecological vision of wholeness. 
Prospects for change may not be at all serious until a countermove-
ment emerges, perhaps one that identified environmentalists as what 
they are, or should be: subverters of the existing order, apostles of 
a new order, aiming to do away with the war system, repudiators 
of the ideology of national sovereignty and of the mindless exploi-
tation of the natural resources of the earth. 
The shape of this new order cannot now be blueprinted. It must 
be an expression of a collaborative process among the people of the 
world. It is certainly not a matter merely of extrapolating existing 
tendencies and designing a world state that drew inspiration from 
the nation-state form. At most we can make the case for the inade-
quacy of the present system of world order, combine it with a dem-
onstration that the technological means exist to support a new equi-
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librium, and advance an argument for the realization of certain 
dominant values. The exact structures of order, processes of tran-
sition, and shifts in wealth-producing capabilities will depend on the 
way in which world-order reeducation and interregional bargaining 
proceed in various parts of the world. How the new world order 
evolves will depend as well on how ecological deterioration manifests 
itself in the years ahead. The search for new solutions will surely 
grow more intense as the evidence mounts that we are faced with a 
crisis of survival. 
